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paradigm have better health outcomes than patients not screened,
even though this is a well-established standard for recommending
screening [9,10].
The NCCN guidelines on distress screening were not based on evi-
dence of patient beneﬁt. There was no consideration of potentialThe Institute of Medicine (IOM) deﬁnes clinical guidelines as
“statements that include recommendations intended to optimize pa-
tient care that are informed by a systematic review of evidence and
an assessment of the beneﬁts and harms of alternative care options”
(p. 4) [1]. However,many clinical guidelines are not based on evidence
[1]. Instead, preference-based value judgments sometimes outweigh
evidence in guideline-making [2], with the risk of this highest when
guideline panels are comprised almost entirely of clinical specialty
group members. Such panels make more non-evidence-based recom-
mendations than multi-disciplinary panels [3], including recommen-
dations for care provided by members of the specialty group [2].
There is consensus on the need for guideline reform [1], so that care
addresses patient needs, but avoids interventions that consume scarce
health care resources without proven patient beneﬁt [4]. As part of
the Choosing Wisely campaign, for instance, 26 US medical societies
have each listed ﬁve commonly used tests or procedures that should
be questioned by physicians and patients [5]. No organizations focused
on mental health have done this.
Drs. Bultz and Carlson [6] faulted our systematic review of screen-
ing for psychological distress in cancer [7] because “it contravenes
recommendations to screen broadly, which are based on prevalence
studies demonstrating that patients experience distress in all of the
physical, psychosocial and practical domains, with a real interplay
among domains” (p. 1-17). They referred to distress screening
guidelines published by the National Comprehensive Cancer Care
Network (NCCN) [8]. They did not provide evidence from random-4333 Cote Ste Catherine Road,
222x5112.
s).
rights reserved.harms orwhether resources would bemorewisely used for other activ-
ities, such as improving care for the many patients with cancer who in-
dicate they need psychosocial support, regardless of screening [11].
Instead, a panel comprised almost exclusively of mental health profes-
sionals drafted the guidelines without reference to any RCTs demon-
strating that patients would beneﬁt [8]. The NCCN should withdraw
these guidelines and should document that a number of major issues
are addressed prior to reconsidering any recommendation for distress
screening.
First, what is meant by “screening” must be adequately deﬁned.
Across medical ﬁelds, the term “screening” indicates a process by
which a screening tool is administered to individuals who are not
known to be at risk of having a target medical condition. Based on a
pre-deﬁned criterion, patients potentially at risk are identiﬁed for fur-
ther assessment and, if appropriate, treatment [9,10]. Screening for
depression, for instance, involves the use of depression symptom
questionnaires to identify patients who may have depression, but
who have not sought treatment andwhose depression has not already
been recognized by healthcare providers [12]. In contrast, the term
“screening” is commonly used in psycho-oncology to describe other
kinds of interventions, which, while possibly useful, are not screening
interventions based on any standard deﬁnition. Reﬂecting this, Bultz
and Carlson suggested that our systematic review should have includ-
ed evidence from 6 trials in which cancer care providers used psycho-
socially oriented questionnaires to inform care consultations regularly
provided to all patients. Patient responses on questionnaires did not
determine whether they would be offered the psychosocial services,
however. That is, they were not used for screening.
Second, the concept of distress is poorly operationalized. It is not
clear what a screen for “distress” is intended to detect. The most
commonly used “distress screening tool” is the distress thermometer
described in the NCCN guidelines [8]. This, and other ultra-short
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to determine their accuracy to detect depressive disorders, i.e., as de-
pression screening tools [13,14]. In other cases, these samemeasures
have been tested for their ability to detect “cancer-related distress,
deﬁned by semi-structured interview” (p. 487) [15], referring to
“an adjustment disorder with or without additional comorbid de-
pression/anxiety” (p. 4671) [13]. In still other cases [13,14], cutoff
scores on these tools have been based on identifying patients with
a score above a cutoff on a longer psychological symptom measure,
such as the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). The
logic of screening with one self-report measure to identify patients
with a high score on a longer self-report measure and labeling the
longer measure a “gold standard criterion for distress” is dubious.
Cutoff scores on longer questionnaires, such as the HADS, are typically
calibrated to maximize combined sensitivity and speciﬁcity for a disor-
der, such as depression. For the HADS, 40–50% of patients with positive
screens may have depression [16], although this falls to 10–20% when
patients already receiving services are appropriately excluded from
consideration [16,17]. So, a positive screen on a “distress screener,” as
calibrated against the HADS or another questionnaire, means that a pa-
tient has some probability (the positive predictive value of the distress
screener to predict a positive screen on the longer questionnaire) of
having another probability (the positive predictive value of the other
questionnaire for depression). Themeaning of this is not clear, and sim-
ply calling this “distress” does not alleviate the problem. Stretching the
concept even further, Bultz and Carlson suggest that for the purpose of
screening, distress should be operationalized multidimensionally,
which in their research involves the simultaneous administration of dif-
ferent “screening tools” for general distress, anxiety, depression, suicid-
al ideation, pain, fatigue, nutrition andweight, aswell as concerns about
accommodations, transportation, parking, drug coverage, work and
school, ﬁnances, and groceries [18].
This broad deﬁnition of distress relates to the third issue that must
be addressed, which is the need for a clear understanding of what are
appropriate targets for screening and how screening programs should
be evaluated. Screening is a preventive intervention, and the United
States Preventive Services Task Force [19], which evaluates evidence
on preventive service interventions in primary care, provides a model
to understand how screeningwithmultiple targets needs to be evaluat-
ed. Primary care physicians are encouraged to screen formany different
conditions, and many of them have psychosocial components (e.g., de-
pression, intimate partner violence, alcohol abuse, smoking). Impor-
tantly, evidence for each of these screening interventions is evaluated
separately. Otherwise, it would be impossible to determine which
screening programs are beneﬁcial and cost-effective. The same logic ap-
plies to psychosocial care in cancer settings. It may be the case that pa-
tients would beneﬁt from being screening for many different problems.
However, consistent with general principles of testing screening pro-
grams and expectations that scarce health care resources must be
used wisely to be used effectively [4,5], a scattershot approach to
screening, without evidence of what works and what doesn't work,
does not serve the best interests of patients. Appropriate targets for
screening are medical problems for which screening can lead to effec-
tive intervention. Problems with parking or insurance can be identiﬁed
by simply asking patients, but do not constitute screening.
Once appropriate targets for screening are identiﬁed, theparameters
for testing the screening program must be carefully considered. Bultz
and Carlson argue that intervention efﬁcacy has nothing to do with
screening. This idea departs dramatically from current understandings
of screening [9,10]. For a screening program to be successful, patients
must agree to be screened, the screening test must identify a signiﬁcant
number of patients who are not already receiving services, patients
must be engaged in an intervention, and they must obtain sufﬁciently
positive treatment results to justify resource utilization [9,10,12]. Effec-
tive treatment is a necessary component of a successful screening pro-
gram, but a trial of screening must be able to distinguish the effect ofscreening versus the effect of providing additional intervention services
that are not otherwise available to patients. Thus, an evaluation of dis-
tress screening should (1) determine trial eligibility and randomize pa-
tients prior to screening; (2) exclude patients already recognized as
needing psychosocial care or already receiving psychosocial services;
and (3) provide similar care management options to patients identiﬁed
in the screening arm of the trial and patients in the trial arm not receiv-
ing screening, but who are identiﬁed as needing services via other
mechanisms, such as their own request or routine clinical interaction.
The NCCN guidelines on distress screening [8] and other recom-
mendations, such as the American College of Surgeons Commission
on Cancer Distress Screening Standard [20] are not based on evi-
dence from well-conducted RCTs that screening results in beneﬁts
to patients and would be a wise use of resources. As researchers
and clinicians, we owe it to cancer patients to base clinical care deci-
sions on rigorous evidence. Without evidence that distress screening
improves health outcomes, there is a real concern that it would con-
sume scarce resources, diverting them from patients already known
to be in need. Sometimes moving forward requires taking a step back
ﬁrst. Advocates for psychosocial cancer care should choose wisely by
reconsidering non-evidence-based recommendations on distress
screening. Furthermore, they should insist that high-quality evi-
dence from trials addressing well-deﬁned questions be obtained
prior to making recommendations.
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